We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the
actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the
preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to
revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline.
In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a
best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only
equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing
interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict
Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically
unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which
equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative
frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.