Theoretical Economics
Journal of the Econometric Society
Edited by: Federico Echenique • ISSN (e): 1555-7561 • ISSN (print): 1933-6837
Edited by: Federico Echenique • ISSN (e): 1555-7561 • ISSN (print): 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics: Oct, 2015, Volume 10, Issue 3
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE1425
p. 691-717
Takuo Sugaya
We study repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and unequal discounting. We characterize the limit set of perfect and public equilibrium payoffs as discount factors converge to 1 with the relative patience between players Â…fixed. We show that the pairwise and individual full rank conditions are sufficient for the folk theorem.