Theoretical Economics

Journal of the Econometric Society

Edited by: Federico Echenique • ISSN (e): 1555-7561 • ISSN (print): 1933-6837

Theoretical Economics: Aug, 2019, Volume 14, Issue 3

An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type

https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3158
p. 849-886

Shinsuke Kambe

This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the possibility of a non-compromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and when the war of attrition ends quickly. As the leading example, we study how a group selects a volunteer in a dynamic setting.


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