Theoretical Economics
Journal of the Econometric Society
Edited by: Federico Echenique • ISSN (e): 1555-7561 • ISSN (print): 1933-6837
Theoretical Economics: Jan, 2023, Volume 18, Issue 1
On guarantees, vetoes and random dictators
https://doi.org/10.3982/TE4832
p. 97-127
Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Hervé Moulin
A mechanism guarantees a certain welfare level to its agents, if each of them can secure that level against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it?
In the n-person probabilistic voting/bargaining model with p deterministic outcomes a guarantee takes the form of a probability distribution over the ranks from 1 to p. If n≥p the uniform lottery is shown to be the only maximal (unimprovable) guarantee. If n
